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Abstract
We study the Downs-Thomson paradox, a situation where an additional road capacity
can cause an overall increase in transport generalized cost and therefore a decrease in welfare
for transport users. To this end, we build an experiment based on a double market-entry
game (DMEG) where users have to choose between road and public transit after that the op-
erator has choosen public transit capacity. The optimal strategy for operator is to minimize
capacity, and the equilibrium for users depend on the endogeneous public transit capacity
compared to exogeneous road capacity. The most important result is that we observe the
Downs-Thomson paradox empirically in the laboratory: An increase in road capacity causes
shift from road to rail and, at the end, increases total travel costs. But the contrary is
not true: A decrease in road capacity does not cause lower total travel costs, which is in
contradiction with our theoretical model. Results also show that the capacity chosen by
operator di¤ers from Nash prediction, levels being signicantly higher than those predicted
by our model. Moreover, users coordinate remarkably well on Nash equilibrium entry rate
while capacity has been chosen by operator.
University of Rennes 1 and CREM-CNRS, 7 place Hoche, 35065 Rennes cedex, France.
yWe thank Richard Arnott, Rachel Croson, Michael Pickhardt and Aurélie Bonein for useful remarks. Thanks
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1 Introduction
In transport economics, an increase in road capacities, by causing shifts from public transit to
private transport, could lead to a new tra¢ c equilibrium where total transport costs are higher.
Indeed, by implementing an additional road capacity (eg a new route or more generally a new
transport alternative), road speed increase, attracting public transit users towards road transport.
Then, as public transit tra¢ c decreases, there is a loss of revenue for public transit operator,
who, in the absence of subsidies, might raise faire or cut service. This well-known phenomenon
has been called Downs-Thomsonparadox (Downs, 1962; Thomson, 1977 ; Mogridge et al, 1987
; Mogridge, 1990a,b, Mogrigde, 1997 ; Arnott & Small, 1994 ; Jones, 2002, Litman, 2005). Such a
phenomenon is an important argument for people who are defending urban pricing for private cars
and consequently investment in (collective) high-capacity systems, in order to increase journey
speeds (See Webster, 1985).
Although the possibility of the Downs-Thomson (DT) Paradox seems to be well accepted,
there is little evidence in the literature to indicate when it might occur. Holden, 1989 suggests
that it may occur "in a city like London, where a signicant fraction of peak tra¢ c is carried
on an extensive rail network". Mogridge et al , 1987 suggest that it may occur by "allocating
even more space to roads when roads are a less e¢ cient carrier of the ow of tra¢ c". These
statements are mainly qualitative, based on intuition and experience.
Economic experiments about congestion tend to be in a growing number (Selten et al., 2007
; Ziegelmeyer et al., 2007 ; Hartmann, 2006 ; Rapoport et al., 2005 ), mainly about road tra¢ c
(departure time or route choice) but, to our knowledge, no experiment exists on the possible
interactions beetween public transit and road tra¢ c, as this interaction could be for instance
investigated in the Downs-Thomson Paradox.
The aim of this paper is to provide empirical support about this paradox. To this end, we
build an economic experiment in which subjects have to choose between two markets, e. g road
and public transit. Our theoretical framework is built upon a class of coordination games named
Market Entry Game (Selten & Güth, 1982 ; Gary-Bobo, 1990). Basically, in a MEG, players
have to choose to enter a market or not to enter: The payo¤ is a decreasing function of the
number of entrants whereas option to stay out gives a constant payo¤. In such games, Nash
equilibriums will give excess entry, implying a social dilemma.
Such games are a very simple and accurate stylisation of congestion process that frequently
occur in the transport eld, rstly because such game implements a negative externality of entry
decision on individualspayo¤s that are to enter, which implies an e¢ ciency problem. Secondly,
at a theoretical level, such games are charactherized by many equilibriums that imply high levels
of coordination for players, such equilibriums being not welfare maximizing.
The main problem if we consider transport choice is that users can choose between alternatives
(routes, modes, departure times, etc.). The idea is that all of these alternatives give to users a
certain utility, this utility being potentially a¤ected by congestion, or, more generally, by the total
number of users who choose this specic alternative. It is not the case in the usual MEG. As we
are interested in choices between modes, we use a Double Market Entry Game framework in order
to deal with such choice alternatives, where the user can choose between two options, both being
a¤ected by tra¢ c level on each option. The second originality of our theoretical framework is to
deal with crossed-externalities, e.g a situation where the choice of player i choosing X a¤ects the
situation of player j, even if player j is to choose the Y option. Last but not least, the externality
produced by one market is negative, whereas the other market gives a positive externality for
individuals choosing it.
But such phenomenons of crossed-externalities are not relevant only for transport eld, of
course. For instance, recently, some politicals in France claim to decrease levels of taxes on
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oil in order to absorb the impact of exploding oil prices for households. The impact of that
could be that, for residential heating especially, households are rst incited to consume more
oil and second, households are incited to di¤er decisions which could reduce oil consumption,
as solar or geothermic solutions for heating. This will produce additional negative externalities
(CO2 emissions and so on) and also reduce positive externalities linked to the choice of more
ecological solutions. Many examples of such phenomenons could be observed in economics, and
our theoretical model can be used for investigating situations that do not deal only with transport
economics.
Our experimental game is a two-stage game where a rst mover A (the operator) has to
choose the public transit capacity. Then, given a road capacity that is xed exogenously by
the experimenter (the planner), subjects B (travellers) have to choose between road transport
(option X) and public transit (option Y). As in a usual MEG, the payo¤ from the rst market
decreases with number of entrants and increases with exogenous capacity. For the second market
(public transit) things are quite di¤erent: The payo¤ from the second market increases both
with the number of entrants and with the capacity chosen by the operator, i.e. player A. Thus,
entry generates negative externality on the road market, and, on the contrary, entry generates a
positive externality on the public transit market. At the tra¢ c users Nash equilibrium, the entry
rate on road increases with exogenous capacity of road and decreases with endogenous capacity of
public transit. As the marginal revenue of public transit entry is less than the marginal revenue
of road entry, the optimal strategy for player A is to x the lowest possible level for public
transit capacity; The Subgame Perfect Equilibrium corresponds to a situation where player A
chooses the minimum capacity, implying too much entry on road and lack of e¢ ciency for the
transport system (Transport cost is not minimized at the tra¢ c equilibrium). In such a game,
an exogenous increase in road capacity generates shifts from public transit to road that leads to
a new tra¢ c equilibrium where e¢ ciency level is lower.
Our experimental design consists in groups of 15 subjects with 1 subject A and 14 subjects B.
At each period, subjects A and B play a two-stage game where subject A chooses rst a capacity
level for public transit. Being informed about As choice, subjects B have to choose between
two options, X (road) and Y (public transit). In each session, subjects play 2 treatments of 20
periods (within-subject design). For some sessions, subjects play rst 20 periods of low capacity
for road market and second 20 periods of high capacity for road market (condition ADD). In
other sessions, subjects play rst the high capacity condition during 20 periods and then play 20
periods in low capacity condition (condition DEL).
16 sessions (8 sessions in the ADD condition and 8 sessions in the DEL condition) of 15 sub-
jects (namely 240 participants, students from various origins, economists, lawyers, psychologists,
etc.) have been held in LABEX (LABoratory for EXperiments in economics and management),
University of Rennes 1 from January to April 2008 under the ZTREE platform (see Fischbacher,
2007).
Our main results indicate that participants A reach remarkably well the entry rate on each
market that is predicted by Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium. It is far from being the case for
participant A, who chooses average capacity level signicantly above the optimal level given
by Nash equilibrium. Moreover, we observe Downs-Thomson Paradox in the laboratory, e.g.
an increase in road capacity for a given group does increase total travel times and therefore is
associated to lower e¢ ciency levels. But we do not observe the reverse phenomenon, that is a
decrease in road capacity does not decrease signicantly total travel times.
In a rst section, we will make some literature review concerning our initial question (Downs-
Thomson Paradox). The second section is devoted to our theoretical model, which is a Double
Market Entry Game both with a negative and a positive externality. Then, we present in a third
section the experimental design, and parameters that had been implemented in the lab. The
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fourth section presents experimental results and the last one is to conclude.
2 Downs-Thomson Paradox and Mogridges conjecture
Martin J.H. Mogridge in his 1990s book Travel in towns: Jam yesterday, jam today and jam
tomorrow?" observes that, especially in London, increasing road capacity tends to increase tra¢ c
congestion: all road investment in a congested urban area, will reduce the average speed of
the transport system as a whole  for road and public transport (e;g. urban mass transit).
He therefore conjectures that improving collective transport could increase welfare. In fact,
Mogridges analyze is a renewed version of the well-known Downs-Thomson paradox (Downs,
1962 ; Thomson, 1977).
Arnott & Small (1994) made an extensive survey about the most famous transport paradoxes.
The Downs-Thomson is a counterintuitive answer to a very simple question: If urban road
capacity is increased, does this result in some improvement in tra¢ c speeds, or does it make
congestion worse?
Shortly, the answer given by the Downs-Thomson Paradox (Downs, 1962 ; Thomson, 1977;
Mogridge, 1986, 1987) is that an increase in road capacities, by causing shifts from public transit
to private transport, could lead to a new tra¢ c equilibrium where total transport costs are
higher. The consequence is then a decrease in welfare level for the conurbation.
The argument is that, by implementing an additional road capacity (eg a new route or
more generally a new transport alternative), road speed increase, attracting public transit users
towards road transport. The consequence is, as public transit tra¢ c decreases, there is a loss
of revenue for public transit operator, who, in the absence of subsidies, might raise faire or cut
service. As Mogridge, 1987 wrote :"This states that, in congested situation, the equilibrium travel
costs will rise if road capacity is increased, if the cost of collective network rises as ow falls. If
follows that increasing road capacity in congested situations is counterproductive"1 .
This paradox regained some interest with the analysis of Martin H. Mogridge in the 80s,
because what was called "Mogridge conjecture" was an important argument for implementing
urban pricing in London city2 . The Mogridges conjecture was that "in conditions of suppressed
demand, the speed of the road network is determined by the speed of the high-capacity network
(rail, bus, etc.)" (Mogridge, 1997 ; Mogridge, 1986).
More precisely, this paradox is the consequence of users equilibrium and of Wardrops rst
principle (users reach an equilibrium where travel costs is equal for each alternative). Such a
paradox is the consequence of induced/latent demand e¤ect (Arnott & Small, 1994 ; Abraham
& Hunt, 2001 ; Nolan, 2001 ; Ameimounga et al., 2005).
To our knowledge, the only empirical evidence about Downs-Thomson had been given by
Mogridge, 1990, 1997. Mogridge asserted that the decrease in speeds in London centre was the
consequence of Downs-Thomson Paradox, e.g. that increase in road network capacity over time
causes decline in tra¢ c for mass transit (train), the global consequence being a growth of travel
times for both users (see table 1 below)
Insert table 1
1Mogridge, 1997 p. 9.
2« The rst (paradox) is that in congested conditions, building more road capacity for cars makes both mo-
torists and users of public transport worse o¤ . By encouraging a shift from public transport to cars it lls up the
new road space, makes public transport less frequent and more expensive, and results in a new equilibrium that
is slower for all. The second paradox follows from the rst: taxing the ine¢ cient road user (the motorist) and
subsidising the e¢ cient (on buses and trains) will make all travellers better o¤ » The Times, March, 17th, 2000.
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Mogridge conjectures then that a decrease in road capacities, or better, an increase in mass
transit capacity, could shift road users to train and can therefore decrease total travel times for
big conurbations. His argument was one important element in favour of London urban pricing
that had been implemented some years after.
The problem of such empirical evidence is that it is almost impossible here to distinguish
precisely the variables that could inuence average travel time, because the ceteris paribus as-
sumption is not respected. That is one major reason for using experimental economics in order
to give empirical evidence to DT paradox, because in the lab, it is possible to isolate the impact
of changing road capacity on userschoices and then on total travel times. The main question
concerning implementation in the lab is about the accurate theoretical model to obtain experi-
mental congestion, that is to say a divergence between private cost and social cost of transport
as a consequence of a coordination problem between transport users.
3 Theoretical model: The Double Market Entry Game
Our theoretical model is an extension of Market Entry Game (Selten and Güth, 1982 and Gary-
Bobo, 1990). In our game, two types of agents, A and B have to make choices. The individual A
is the public transit operator, and has to choose capacity level for market 2 (public transit).Then,
individuals B (transport users) have to choose between market 1 (road transit) and market 2
(public transit). We will assume that market 1s capacity is given for transport users and that
market 2s capacity is chosen by public transit operator. Our game is sequential, e. g. individual
A chooses capacity of market 2, other paramaters being common knowledge. In the second step,
users know capacities for each market, and choose to enter market 1 or market 2. Using backward
induction, we will assume that, if public transit operator knows how players B choose between
market 1 and market 2, he should choose the capacity level that maximizes his payo¤.
3.1 Userstra¢ c equilibrium (one-shot game)
Players B have to choose simultaneously between the option X (Road or Market 1) and Y (Public
Transit or Market 2). Di¤ering from the usual MEG, there is no outside option which gives a
given payo¤ for sure (see above).
The individual payo¤ for a user choosing road transit is3 :
i1 = k1 + r1 (c1  m1) if i = X (1)
whereas the individual payo¤ of using public transit is:
i2 = k2 + r2 (c2 +m2) if i = Y (2)
Where c1 and c2 are respectivly the capacities of road and public transit, m1 and m2 are
respectivly the number of users choosing market 1 (road) and market 2 (public transit), r1, r2; k1,
k2 are positive parameters with r1 > r2 and k1 > k2: All these parameters are to be known by
all participants B before they choose which market to enter4 . Such information is also given to
participant A (the operator for market 2).
Constraints are:
3The market 1 technology is similar to the payo¤ for entering on market in a usual Market Entry Game (see
Erev & Rapoport, 1998).
4Our game di¤ers from Rapoport et al., 2000 Two Market Entry Game (TMEG) in one major respect: Entering
rst or second market implies a decrease in individual payo¤s for both markets in TMEG, whereas in our DMEG
case, more entrants on market 2 increase individual payo¤ for each entrant.
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m1 +m2 = n (3)
or equivalently
m2 = n m1 (4)
and that
c1 + c2 < n (5)
Where n is the nite number of transport users.
In this model, using road transit is supposed to create a negative externality, as in the usual
MEG, whereas using public transit is supposed to create a positive externality. This positive
externality is linked to the fact that, if capacity is xed, the increase in public transit enables to
increase frequencies and then decrease time travel cost (see Arnott and Small, 19945).
Users equilibrium is reached when:
k1 + r1 (c1  m1) = k2 + r2 (c2 +m2) (6)
Then, combining equns. (8) and (10), and as  r1 + r2 6= 0;we have:
m1 =
k1   k2   r2 (n+ c2) + c1r1
r1   r2 (7)
And consequently
m2 =
1
r1   r2 (k2   k1 + nr1   c1r1 + c2r2) (8)
The entry rate (tra¢ c) on market 1 (market 2) is respectively increasing (decreasing) with
c1; k1; r1 and n, decreasing with c2; k2 and r2: Of course, such a theoretical prediction holds for
a continuum of agents. In the experimental game, theoretical predictions will be made without
this assumption (see below).
3.2 Optimal choice for public transit operator
We assume that the prot  for public transit operator is simply the di¤erence between the
number of public transit users and the capacity he chooses, e.g.:
 = m2   c2 (9)
Thus, replacing m2 with equ. (8), and using eqn (11), we obtain
5"If more people take the train, then trains run more frequently, saving people some waiting time at the
station", p.4 . Such a property is a technological property of all types of mass transit, as it was shown by
Mohring, 1972.
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 =

n 

k1   k2   r2 (n+ c2) + c1r1
r1   r2

  c2 =
n  c2   k1
r1   r2 +
k2
r1   r2 + n
r2
r1   r2   c1
r1
r1   r2 + c2
r2
r1   r2
If we assume that r2r1 r2 < 1, the optimal solution is a corner solution where c2 equals zero.
Then, in the one-shot game, the theoretical prediction based on pure strategy Nash equilib-
rium is that the operator chooses the minimum capacity level and consequently, users coordinate
to enter for some of them on "road market" and for the others on "public market", entry rates for
road and public transit being given respectively by eqns (11) and (12). If players know that the
one-shot game is to be repeated a nite number of times, then the equilibrium for the one-shot
game should be implemented at each period6 .
3.3 Downs-Thomson (DT) Paradox
The Downs-Thomson Paradox is a situation where welfare is to be decreased when road (market
1) capacity increases, the other market (public transit) capacity remaining constant. This occurs
because too many users shift from road market to public transit market.
The level of welfare in the Double Market Entry Game is simply the sum of all players payo¤s,
that is:
W = (m2   c2) +m1 (k1 + r1 (c1  m1)) +m2 (k2 + r2 (c2 +m2)) (10)
Or, equivalently, given eqn (8)
W = (n m1   c2) +m1 (k1 + r1 (c1  m1)) + (n m1) (k2 + r2 (c2 + n m1)) (11)
Furthermore, we obtained previously the expression (11) on entry rate in market 1 (road),
which could be replaced in the former equation giving welfare. After simplication, it gives:
W =
1
r1   r2
 
k2   k1 + nr1   c1r1   c2r1 + 2c2r2 + n2r1r2   nk1r2 + nk2r1   nc1r1r2 + nc2r1r2

(12)
Assume that capacity c2 is to be constant, since we are for the moment not interested in
the behavior of player A. Let call WHIGH the level of welfare obtained in a situation where
road capacity is high, say c1 and WLOW the level of welfare obtained in a situation where road
capacity is low, say c1. We have then c1 > c

1:
If the DT Paradox is to occur, then an exogeneous increase in road capacity should decrease
welfare level. If we compute the variation in welfare level from low capacity to high capacity, we
have, after manipulation:
W =WHIGH  WLOW =  r1 c1   c

1
r1   r2 (nr2 + 1) < 0 (13)
6Nevertheless, it is fair to remark that in the repeated game, such a prediction does not hold necessarily (see
Gaechter & Falk, 2002, p5). One argument is that if players are from di¤erent "types", the game is of incomplete
information which might rise possibility for playing cooperative behaviour. Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts and Wilson,
1982 show that, even if there is a small probability that the adversary is, e.g., a "tit for tat" player, cooperative
play can be supported until the nal period.
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This expression is negative, since all parameters are positive in the DMEG, i.e. increasing
road capacity causes a decrease in welfare, which gives a theorem and its corollary.
Theorem 1 In the Double-Market Entry Game, an increase in markets 1 capacity, the other
market capacity remaining constant, will decrease level of Welfare by shifting users from market
2 to market 1 (Downs-Thomson Paradox)
Corollary 2 A decrease in Markets 1 capacity will increase Welfare level.
Such a theoretical result is precisely what is to be tested in our experimental treatments.
4 Experimental design
In this section, we present the di¤erent experimental treatments that have been implemented in
the lab, and therefore, given the specic values we had for parameters, we give the experimental
predictions implied by the theoretical model presented above.
4.1 Experimental treatments
In each session, a group of 15 subjects participate to the double market-entry game described
above. At the beginning of the experiment, a randomly chosen subject plays role A and the
others subjects play role B. Roles remain constant throughout the session (partners design, one
subject A and 14 subjects B). Each participant plays 40 periods of a two-stage game. For each
period, the two-step game is the following: In the rst step, subject A choose a positive integer
number concerning level for market 2, from 1 to 11. Then, participants B are informed about As
choice, and have subsequently to choose to enter market 1 or market 2. At the end of the period,
all participants are informed about the current number of entrants on market 1 and market 2,
about the payo¤s of each participant (payo¤s are symmetrical for participants B). Then, a new
period begins.
In each session, participants plays two subsequent games for 20 periods. Instructions specied
that they will play two games of 20 periods subsequently. The only di¤erence between the two
games is the capacity of market 1, which could be high or low (see table below about the
parameters that have been used). For 20 periods, participants play rst low capacity and then
high capacity in some sessions (condition ADD) and, in other sessions, participants play rst
high capacity and then low capacity (condition DEL). There is no contextualization or framing
in the instructions that do not talk about transport. Instructions refer to option X (market 1
or road) and option Y (market 2 or public transit) that has to be chosen by participants B.
Participants B are aware about the value of c2 chosen by participant A, which is not described to
be an operator who has to choose a given capacity. At the end of the experiment, all participants
answer to post-experimental surveys, one to elicit individual risk aversion7 and the other to have
some information about socioeconomic characteristics and to have some debrieng from subjects.
The parameters that had been implemented in the experiment are the following:
Insert Table 2 about here
7As many experimenters, we use the Holt-Laury procedure to elicit the level of Constant Risk Relative Aversion
(CRRA) index. For more details, see Holt & Laury, 2002.
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In the experiment, participants payo¤s are given in points, and an exchange rate in Euros is
announced for each point to be gained nally at the end of the experiment. In order to avoid
income e¤ect, and because losses were possible in a given round for any participants, 4 rounds
among the 40 that have been played have been randomly chosen to determine the nal payo¤,
and we add as usual a participation fee.
4.2 Theoretical equilibriums
In this particular kind of game (multiple stage games with observed actions), the equilibria are
obtained by implementing Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) method. A strategy prole is a
subgame-perfect equilibrium if it represents a Nash equilibrium of every subgame of the original
game. As often, we use the common method of backward induction in order to determine
subgame perfect equilibria. Given our particular parameters (see table 2), the SPE corresponds
to a capacity choice of c2 = 1 for player A and to an entry rate of 6 players B on market 1
(road), e.g. 8 players B on market 2 (public transit) when road capacity is equal to 3 (treatment
LOW ). When road capacity is equal to 6 (treatment HIGH ), the optimal strategy remains to
choose c2 = 1 for player A, but the entry rates are changing, giving 10 players B on market 1 and
consequently 4 players B on market 2. Of course, there is also di¤erent equilibria for subgame B
depending on As choice about capacity of market 2.
For instance, assume we have 7 players B on market 1 and 7 players B on market 2 after
player A chose c2 = 1. Each player B gains 2 points. This is not a Nash equilibrium since a
player B could gain 0.25 point if she deviate and choose Y (2.25 points for option Y and 3 points
for option X). At this point, we have 6 players B on m1 and 8 players B on m2. If an additional
player B deviate to choose Y, he will gain 0.25, obtaining 2.5, but leaving 3 not to choose X.
Then, for c2 = 1, Nash Pure Strategy equilibria for subgame B imply 6 players B choosing X
and 8 players B choosing Y.
For c2 levels higher than 1, the number of entrants on m1 decreases.
The following table summarizes theoretical predictions given the specic values of parameters
chosen in the experimental design.
Insert table 3 about here
The increase in road capacity makes road choice more attractive, implying 4 additional users
in HIGH treatment compared to the LOW treatment. The consequence is that payo¤s for all
individuals decrease, and consequently the e¢ ciency level at the asymmetric Pure Nash Equilibria
is lower in the HIGH treatment. As the maximum level of welfare should be obtained by choosing
maximum capacity for public transit, with no user entering on road, the change in road capacity
does not a¤ect e¢ ciency level.
5 Experimental results
Sessions have been held in LABEX, Rennes, from January to April 2008, under the ZTREE
platform (Fischbacher, 2007). The average duration of a session was 1h30 for an average payo¤
of 15 euros for participants B, 20 euros for participant A. There had 16 sessions of 15 participants,
ie 240 subjects. 8 sessions were made in the ADD condition and also 8 sessions were made in
the DEL condition.
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5.1 Capacity choices for public transit
Here we analyse subject Achoice about the capacity level for market 2 (public transit) and its
determinants. Let remind that theoretical predictions given above indicate that public transit
operator capacity choice should not be inuenced at the end by the exogeneous road capacity. In
all treatments, subject A should choose the minimum capacity in order to maximize her prot.
The main results concerning capacity choice by subject A are the following. First, there is
no signicant di¤erence about the level of capacity chosen by A for public transit for treatments
HIGH and LOW, as theoretical model suggests. Second, the average capacity chosen by A tend
to be signicantly higher than levels to be predicted by theoretical model. But, it decreases
with repetition, suggesting some kind of learning. Finally, it has to be noticed that there is
considerable heterogeneity within and between the individual data.
Actually, average capacity chosen by subjects A is given in the following table. For ADD
condition, the average capacity for market 2 is around 3.79 whereas it is 3.75 for DEL condition.
The data analysis in the table below indicates that individual behaviours are quite heteregeneous,
especially in the DEL condition for LOW treatment, where some subjects choose repeatedly the
minimum capacity whereas other subjects tend to focalise on a "middle-point" level for capacity
c1 = 6 (HIGH treatment).
Insert table 4
The average capacity chosen in LOW treatments is not signicantly di¤erent from the average
capacity chosen in HIGH treatments. A bilateral Mann-Whitney Wilcoxon rank-sum test about
the equality of average capacity chosen in the ADD condition for LOW treatment to the average
capacity chosen in the DEL condition for HIGH treatment could not reject the assumption
(z =  0:630, p = 0:529). A similar test assuming the equality of capacity chosen for LOW
treatment in the DEL condition to capacity chosen for HIGH treatment in the ADD condition
gives comparable results (z =  0:421, p = 0:674).
If a within-subjects comparison is conducted, it is possible to observe that average capacity
tend to be higher in the rst treatment compared to the second treatment, as it is suggested by
graphs below, especially for the DEL condition (see also table 4 for other evidence).
Insert gure 1 about here
Insert gure 2 about here
Such an intuition is conrmed by non parametrical analysis (Wilcoxon matched pairs test).
In ADD condition, there is a signicant di¤erence about capacity chosen by A depending on
capacity level c1. Average capacity is higher in « LOW » treatment compared to « HIGH »
treatment (Wilcoxon matched-paired sign rank, bilateral, z = 2:106, p = 0:0352**).
In DEL condition, there is also a (weak) signicant di¤erence LOW and HIGH treatments
(Wilcoxon, z =  1:820, p = 0:0687*), average capacity chosen by subject A being higher in
HIGH treatment compared to LOW treatment.
Such a result is conrmed if data are pooled together (sessions ADD and DEL) and if a
Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed rank test is conducted. The assumption is that average capacity
chosen by A during the rst 20 periods is equal to the average capacity chosen by A during the last
20 periods. Such an assumption is strongly rejected (bilat. Wilcoxon, z = 2:795, p = 0:0052***),
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suggesting clearly that average capacity chosen in the rst 20 periods is signicantly higher
than the average capacity chosen in the last 20 periods. This temporal trend is conrmed by
parametrical analysis. We conduct a Panel Regression about individual choices for market 2s
capacity (left censored, Tobit Analysis, Random E¤ects GLS). Results are given in the following
table.
Insert table 5
The above regression indicates that market 1 capacity plays an ambiguous role: The coe¢ cient
is positive and signicant when data are pooled, but becomes non signicant when capacity choice
is analyzed for each condition. Given the limited number of data, we have to be cautious with
econometric results. Nevertheless, some variables play a key role, as risk aversion level and time
(period). There is a clear trend to have a decrease in capacity level chosen by A from period to
period, as non parametrical analysis suggested above. Moreover, the more risk averse participant
A is, the lower capacity she chooses.
5.2 Entry on markets
Entry rate on markets is obviously related to capacity on each market. The theoretical model
predicts that when road capacity is LOW, entry rate on road should decrease whereas higher
levels of capacity for public transit decrease it. Actually, the important result is that entry on
market 1 is higher when capacity for this market is higher. Figures 3 and 4 give the average
entry rate on market 1 (road) respectivly for ADD condition and for DEL condition.
Insert gure 3 about here
Insert gure 4
Figures above indicate clearly that entry rate increases when road capacity is to be increased.
Such empirical result is statistically signicant, as non parametrical tests show. In ADD con-
dition the average entry rate is 6.07 in the LOW treatment compared to an average entry rate
of 9.43 in the HIGH treatment (road capacity is doubled). A within subject Wilcoxon test is
signicant at the 5% level (z =  2:521 ; p = :0117). That is also the case in DEL condition,
where average entry rate tends to be higher in HIGH treatment (the average entry rate is around
6.41 in LOW treatment compared to 8.63 in HIGH treatement, the Wilcoxon matched paired
sign-rank test indicates z =  2:524 ; p = :0116).
Such an empirical evidence is also clearly demonstrated when we implement between subjects
comparison. If the entry rate of the LOW treatment in the ADD condition is compared to the
entry rate in the HIGH treatment for the DEL condition (these two treatments constitute both
the rst part of the experiment for these participants), the entry rate are respectivly 6.07 and 8.63,
which is signicant at the 1% level (bilateral Mann-Whitney test, z =  3:366, p = :0008). The
same result is obtained by comparing average entry rate in each group for the HIGH treatment
in the ADD condition and average entry rate per group for the LOW treatment in the DEL
condition (such treatments constitute the nal part of the experiment). A bilateral Mann-
Whitney indicates clearly that entry rate when (road) capacity is high is statistically higher than
entry rate when capacity is low (z = +3:363 ; p = :0008, signicant at the 1% level).
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Another result is that entry rate on road tends to increase over time, indicating some learning
process for participants B. Throughout the repetition of game, they clearly understood that they
tend to underenter on road market, and they change gradually their choice to match Pure
Strategy Nash equilibrium entry rate. But such a result is statistically signicant only for the
HIGH treatments: Entry rate in ADD condition for the high treatment (part 2 of the experiment)
is higher than the entry rate in DEL condition for the same treatment (9.43 compared to 8.63,
bilateral Mann-Whitney, z = +2:298 ; p = :0027, signicant at the 1% level). But such a result
has to be cautiously interpretated, because it could also be the consequence of participants
heterogeneity.
In order to have more details about participant B behaviour, we conduct a parametrical
analysis concerning variables that could inuence Bs choice. This parametric analysis explains
factors that inuence the probability p to enter on market 1 (road) for a participant B in period
t (Panel Data analysis). Obviously, probability (1   p) will be the probability not to enter on
market 1, and therefore to enter on market 2, since there is no outside option in our game. The
results of this probit analysis are given in the following table.
Insert table 6 around here
The dependant variable is the probability to enter on market 1 in period t for a participant B.
The explanatory variables are the following. ct1 is the capacity of market 1 in period t, c
t
2 is the
capacity of market 2 chosen by participant A in period t, and ct 12 is the same lagged variable.
mt 11 is the observed number of entrants in market 1 at the last period, RISK is the level of
CRRA index for the participant8 , t 1i is his payo¤ in the last period, COND is a dummy
variable concerning experimental condition (=1 if ADD and =0 if DEL) and t relates to the time
variable.
When we analyse entry for B subjects, we nd some intuitive results, that are in line with our
theoretical predictions. Entry rate on a market depends positively on its capacity and negatively
of the other market capacity. Moreover, previous choice of capacity for participant A inuences
entry choice for participant B: The more she chose in the previous period, the less he enters
on road. An other interesting result concerns userscoordination during the experiment. The
number of entrants in previous period increases the probability to enter in the current period
(signicant at the 5% level for DEL condition and for the pooled data, but not for the ADD
condition). Subjects B anticipate that high previous entry rate implies low entry rate for the
current period and vice versa (they anticipate some cyclical oscillation around an average entry
rate on road). There is also learning processes, since entry on road tends to increase with
repetition (subjects understand that road choice is risky but no so much as anticipated (possible
negative payo¤s)). As before, such a variable is signicant at the 5% level for DEL treatment and
for pooled data, but not for ADD treatment. Then the above result is conrmed by parametric
analysis. Last but not least, the more participant risk averse, the less the probability to enter.
5.3 Payo¤s and Welfare
As road capacity grows, shifts from public transit to road choice may rst decrease congestion
risk and so increase payo¤s for those who choose road. All things being equal, higher capacity
should increase group welfare. Of course, such assumption does not hold, since additional users
8Actually the number of safe lotteries chosen by the participant in our expost survey, this survey being based
on Holt & Laury, 2002.
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on road may decrease the level for the positive externality of public transit. Moreover, if public
transit operator reduce her capacity in order to decrease her operating costs, her prot may
decrease also. At the end, these two negative e¤ects could decrease welfare level for the entire
group.
5.3.1 Prot for Public Transit Operator
We have observed previously that increasing road capacity does not change signicantly capacity
choice for subject A. But, it changes drastically the distribution of subjects B by encouraging
them to choose road more frequently. The consequence is that, clearly, prot for A (i.e. M2  c2)
decreases.
Watching the experimental data, the important result is that prot for B is higher in the
LOW treatment compared to the HIGH treatment (see gure 5).
Insert gure 5
That is precisely one component of the Downs-Thomson paradox. Increasing road capacity
will make public transit users shifting to road, which precisely decreases revenue for opera-
tor9 . This empirical result is clearly established with non parametrical tests, for within and
beetween-subject analysis. A Wilcoxon matched-paired sign rank test for each condition estab-
lishes a signicant di¤erence about As prot between LOW and HIGH treatments (bilateral,
z = 2:521, p = 0:0117, signicant at the 5% level). The positive value of z means that As
prot is signicantly higher in LOW treatment for both conditions. Such a result is conrmed
by between-subject analysis. A Mann-Whitney Rank Sign Test about the equality of As prot
for treatment LOW for ADD condition and for treatment HIGH for DEL condition is strongly
rejected (z = 3:046, p = 0:0023, signicant at the 1% level). We nd a comparable result by as-
suming the equality of average As prot for treatment LOW for DEL condition and for treatment
HIGH for ADD condition (z = 3:363, p = 0:0008, signicant at the 1% level).
5.3.2 Group Welfare
The following graphs show the evolution of total group payo¤ throughout the periods of the
experiment. The total group payo¤ for a given group at period t is:
W t = tA +m
t
1
 
tB1

+
 
n mt1

tB2 (14)
Average group payo¤ depending on period is given in gure 6. In this gure, the green
dashed-line recalls maximum e¢ ciency level, while the red dashed lines recall e¢ ciency level
predicted by Pure Asymmetric Nash equilibria.
Insert gure 6
The average Group payo¤ for LOW treatment in ADD condition is 42.6 (indicated by the blue
line), which is remarkably near Nash equilibrium e¢ ciency level. In the HIGH treatment, average
9Arnott et al., 1993 wrote p.148 "If road capacity is now expanded, users will shift to the road until it is as
congested as before. If the railway has to balance its budget, the loss of revenue will force it to increase fares and
cut service (...)".
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group payo¤ is around 32, which is higher than Nash equilibrium level (28), but not signicantly.
Clearly, welfare level decreases when road capacity is to be increased. A non parametrical test
conrms this intuition (Wilcoxon, p = 0.0078***) in ADD condition.
Insert gure 7 about there
In the DEL condition, the average group payo¤ is around 39.8 for HIGH treatment, to be
compared to 38.7 in LOW treatment. Actually, there is no signicant di¤erence about welfare
between the treatments. The decrease in road capacity does not succeed to increase signicantly
payo¤s both for subjects B and subject A (theoretically, NE should give 28 points in HIGH
treatment and then 40 points in the LOW treatment). This is because Group payo¤ in the rst
treatment (HIGH) is quite high compared to the Nash prediction (around 40 on average to be
compared with 28 theoretically). This relatively high level of welfare results essentially from
participant Bs behaviour. As he is not extracting all the rent (he should gain 3 points in the
HIGH treatment and he actually gains 1 point) by choosing high capacity levels, his payo¤ is
very low. But these higher capacity levels do not give higher entry rate for market 2 (compared to
Nash Perfect Subgame equilibrium), which is around 6. That means participants B who choose
market 2 increases their payo¤ because capacity is higher for the market they choose.
The last result is about the interaction beetween participants A and participants B. It is
possible to see that participants B coordinate quite well on subgame Nash equilibrium after
participant A chose market 2 capacity, as it can be viewed in gure 8 below.
Insert gure 8 about here
The gure gives the empirical average entry rate compared to theoretical entry rate given
by Pure Strategy Nash equilibrium for the subgame of participants B10 . The rst observation is
that empirical entry rate is close to theoretical one, whatever exogeneous capacity for market 1
(low or high), e.g indicating a high level of coordination for participants B. Another observation
is that average observed entry rate tends to be higher compared to theoretical one in the LOW
treatment, which is not the case in HIGH treatment. Such a result is similar to what was already
observed by Camerer & Lovallo (1999) in the usual MEG, who observe that there is overentry
when capacity is low and underentry when capacity of the market is high.
6 Concluding comments
The aim of this paper was to give empirical, and more precisely, experimental evidence to a well-
known phenomenon discussed since years in transport economics, the Downs-Thomson Paradox.
To this end we build a theoretical model inspired on the usual Market Entry Game and based,
rstly, on an individual choice between two markets, and, secondly, on the fact each market
generates either a negative externality or a positive one. The third originality in our model is
to implement an endogenous choice of capacity for one of these two markets before individuals
(users) have to enter, the other market capacity being exogeneous. The theoretical equilibrium
10The dashed line has to be interpreted cautiously, since for some capacity levels of market 2, there is more
than one theoretical entry rate predicted by Pure Strategy Nash equilibrium. We took the "average" theoretical
entry rate in the gure for convenience.
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(pure strategy Nash) is such that, given the particular subgame for users, the operator should
choose the minimum capacity for his market, and for this level, given a certain xed capacity
for the other market, users allocate themself between the two markets. An exogeneous shock
concerning the capacity of the rst market should give an incentive for users to switch from
one market to the other, the optimal strategy of the operator being the same: When exogeneous
capacity increases, users ew from market 2 to market 1 and vice versa. The consequences of such
an exogeneous shock are that, rst, on operators revenue - it decreases when exogeneous capacity
increases - and second on total welfare for the group - it decreases when exogeneous capacity
increases since total users cost increases. That is, our simple theoretical model predicts Downs
Thomson Paradox. To test it, we implement experimental sessions in which some subjects are
rst confronted to a low capacity level and second to a high capacity level (ADD condition) and
for other subjects, it is the contrary (DEL condition). The rst condition corresponds precisely
to Downs-Thomson situation, whereas the reverse condition is closer to Mogridge conjecture.
The results we obtained are the following. Firstly, we observe that Downs-Thomson Paradox
is produced in the laboratory, which gives empirical support for such a phenomenon. Secondly,
we nevertheless do not observe that decreasing market capacity exogeneously does produce some
improvement in welfare level.
The second result is that, for a given vector of capacity levels, users coordinate remarkably
well on average around the entry rate predicted by pure strategy Nash equilibrium for the users
subgame. This result is in line with former results obtained in experimental studies for Market
Entry Games, but we have to notice that our game is almost more complex for subjects, which
precisely make coordination problem more di¢ cult to solve for them.
The third important result is that operator does not choose the minimum level of capacity,
far from it, and that his choice responds very little to exogeneous road capacity. Such a result is
obviously linked to the repeated partners design we implement in the lab, since it enables both
reciprocity e¤ect and reputation e¤ect that might increase the level of capacity he chooses.
In terms of transport policies, what our results indicate is that, rst, as was saying Roy
Kienitz (executive director of the Surface Transportation Policy Project, cited by Litman, 2005):
Widening roads to ease congestion is like trying to cure obesity by loosening your belt. It
might be useless to solve road congestion by increasing road capacity, at least in the short term.
Secondly, policy makers should be cautious about the temptation to solve congestion problems
by thinking that a decrease in road capacity (or an increase in public transit capacity, the road
capacity being constant) might reduce total transport costs.
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Table 1. Average speed for private car and rail in London centre
Source : Mogridge (1997)
Table 2. Experimental sessions
parameters sessions conditions number of
sessions
participants
LOW treatment HIGH treatment ADD treat 1 +
treat2
8 120
k1 6 6 DEL treat 2 +
treat 1
8 120
k2 0 0 Total 16 240
r1 1 1
r2 0.25 0.25
c1 3 6
c2 endogenous endogenous
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Table 3. Theoretical predictions (asymmetric Pure Nash Equilibria)
treatment c2 m1 m2 iA 
i
B if 
i =
X
iB if 
i =
Y
WNash WMax
c1 = 3
(LOW)
1 6 8 7 3 2.25 43 90.5
c1 = 6
(HIGH)
1 10 4 3 2 1.25 28 90.5
Table 4. Capacity chosen by subject A per group
capacity c2 (mean and s.d., individual data)
cond. group LOW HIGH
ADD 1 2.55 (3.33) 1.9 (2.29)
2 3.35 (2.21) 3.6 (2.70)
3 5.15 (0.86) 4.65 (0.59)
4 4.1 (2.31) 3.6 (2.56)
5 4.5 (2.65) 2.7 (2.11)
6 3.05 (2.28) 3.25 (2.53)
9 5.75 (1.37) 3.95 (1.64)
10 5.1 (2.31) 3.45 (2.74)
average (s.d) 4.19 (2.47) 3.39 (2.33)
DEL 7 1 (0) 1.5 (2.01)
8 1 (0) 2.75 (3.23)
11 3.9 (2.75) 4.25 (2.67)
12 1.35 (0.81) 3.65 (3.08)
13 6 (1.38) 5.9 (3.09)
14 6.3 (0.57) 5.7 (2.15)
15 1.8 (0.83) 5.8 (2.02)
16 3.75 (1.89) 5.4 (2.74)
average (s.d) 3.14 (2.44) 4.39 (3.02)
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Table 5. Panel censored Tobit regression on individual choice for c2
variable pooled data (1) ADD (2) DEL (3)
ct1 market 1 capacity in period t 0.208** 0.112 -0.111
(0.0870) (0.218) (0.243)
t 1i payo¤ of subject A in period (t-1) -0.0522 0.00975 -0.0977
(0.0564) (0.0753) (0.0839)
mt 12 (number of entrants for market 2 in period (t-1) 0.0846 -0.0711 0.222**
(0.0669) (0.0955) (0.0931)
COND (=1 if ADD ; 0 if DEL) 0.194 / /
(1.128) / /
risk aversion level -0.622** -0.133 -0.786**
(0.254) (0.355) (0.358)
t -0.0754*** -0.0665** -0.124***
(0.0112) (0.0292) (0.0323)
Constant 0 6.521*** 5.232** 9.071***
(1.854) (2.046) (3.020)
Num. of Obs. 624 312 312
Subjects 16 8 8
Rho 0.369 0.179 0.488
***: signicant at 1%, **: sign. at 5%, *: sign. at 10%
NB: The estimated model is
ct2 = 1c
t
1 + 2
t 1
i + 3m
t 1
2 + 4 (COND) + 5 (RISK) + 6t+ 0
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Table 6. Panel Probit Regression about choice to enter on market 1 (road) for participant B
variable (1) pooled data (2) ADD (3) DEL
ct1 0.175*** 0.190*** 0.190***
(0.0139) (0.03) (0.0298)
ct2 -0.0561*** -0.0414*** -0.0734***
(0.00646) -0.00896 -0.00951
mt 11 0.0293** 0.00685 0.0528***
-0.0122 -0.0182 -0.0166
ct 12 -0.0190*** -0.0296*** -0.00297
-0.00697 -0.00962 -0.0103
Risk aversion -0.0601*** -0.0560** -0.0645**
-0.0193 -0.024 -0.0314
t 1i 0.0774*** 0.0564** 0.0985***
-0.0175 -0.0256 -0.0243
COND 0.0231 / /
-0.0673
t 0.00424*** 0.00423 0.00841**
-0.00135 -0.00364 -0.00371
Constant 0 -0.555*** -0.412** -0.908***
-0.161 -0.205 -0.306
Observations 8736 4368 4368
Number of subject 224 112 112
Ln sigma2u -1.581*** -1.752*** -1.418***
-0.122 -0.175 -0.17
Sigma u 0.454 0.416 0.492
0.028 0.037 0.042
rho 0.171 0.148 0.195
0.017 0.022 0.027
***: signicant at 1%, **: sign. at 5%, *: sign. at 10%
NB: The estimated model is
Pr (i = X) = 1c
t
1 + 2c
t
2 + 3m
t 1
1 + 4c
t 1
2 + 5 (RISK) + 6
t 1
i + 7 (COND) + 8t+ 0
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Figure 1. Average capacity chosen by B in each period (ADD condition)
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Figure 2. Average capacity chosen by B in each period (DEL condition)
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Figure 3. Average number of entrants on market 1 in each period - ADD condition
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Figure 4. Average number of entrants on market 1 in each period - DEL condition
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Figure 5. Average payo¤ for Participant B in each period - ADD and DEL conditions
Figure 6. Average Group Payo¤ in each period - ADD condition
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Figure 7. Average Group Payo¤ in each period - DEL condition
DEL condition
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Figure 8. Entry rates on road as a function of capacity chosen by the operator (participant A)
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